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The Global Financial Governance Initiative: 
A Proposed Process of Research and Policy Dialogue on 
Reforming the International Financial Architecture' 
(First Draft) 
The current proposal is based on the discussions of the Global Financial Governance 
Planning Meeting, held at the International Development Research Centre, May 31 - June 1, 
1999, and subsequent planning meetings of specific working groups. The development of the 
proposal has been coordinated by the International Development Research Centre. 
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1. Introduction 
Turmoil in international financial markets has generated widespread instability thrice in this 
decade, the last two episodes (centred in Mexico and Asia) visiting calamity upon millions of 
people in the developing world. The economic crisis that began in Thailand in July 1997 and has 
since spread to or affected every part of the world has brought to the fore of research and policy 
debates, once again, the matter of the intellectual and institutional underpinnings of the current 
international arrangements to deal with such events. 
Such developments present the world with a crucial opportunity to be seized, a historically 
unique chance to reform the world's financial and economic architecture, with the possibility of 
creating a global economic system that is more inclusive as well as more stable. Moreover, new 
administrations in several G7 countries present an unusually receptive climate within which 
global economic reform is pursued. If global markets are to work with greater predictability and 
provide sustainable benefits to the vast majority of the world's population, the international rules 
of the game and the institutional landscape within which they are enforced, need to be very 
different from those of the "non-system" that the world has now. 
Particularly as crises multiply and intensify, it appears probable that there will be an official 
process of discussions during the next few years, aimed at reforming global economic 
governance and remedying systemic vulnerabilities to instability and intense crises. While there 
is a wide-ranging debate on these issues, there are two divides which are important yet remain 
unresolved. The first is between developed and developing countries. Existing fora that 
nominally play the role of bridging this gap (UNCTAD, the Bank-Fund Boards, the G22) do not 
command the necessary consensus to ensure effectiveness. The second divide is between the 
research sector and the policy sector. Here too, reconciliation between the long view and 
structured approach that characterizes the best outputs of the "academic" sector and the 
exigencies facing "practitioners" has been disappointing. 
On May 31St and June 1st, 1999, the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) hosted a -' 
meeting which aimed to discuss how to initiate a process of on-going dialogue on these issues, 
which would narrow the gap between Northern and Southern perspectives, as well as those 
between the academic, non-governmental, private sector, and (official) policy communities, and 
ultimately respond to the unique opportunity to inform and influence official discussions on the 
international financial system at this juncture. This planning meeting was attended by 16 
participants from academic institutions, research and international organizations, and the 
Canadian government. Meeting discussions covered the range of issues posed by recent episodes 
of financial instability (higher volatility, contagion, etc.); the nature of the academic and policy 
discussions on reform to the international financial architecture which ensued; the need to 
address key deficiencies in the debate (North-South, and research-policy divides); and how a 
process of research and dialogue could be best conceived and designed to realize this. Through 
these discussions, meeting participants discussed the problematique for research and policy and 
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constructed the basic parameters surrounding the ambit, structure, and modalities of a new 
process of research and dialogue on reforming the international financial architecture and 
developing effective institutions of global financial governance, which is developed in the 
current proposal. Subsequent meetings of working groups, planned during these discussions, 
were held to further develop the program of work on specific elements of this initiative. 
2. Global Financial Crises and Reforming the International Financial Architecture: 
The Problematique for Research and Policy 
2.1 The Current Financial System and Issues Related to its Performance 
The current international financial architecture dates back to the Bretton Woods conference, 
which created a framework whose primary objective was to promote global trade within a fixed 
exchange rate regime. Coordinated trade promotion through the Bretton Woods institutions led to 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which in turn led to the creation of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
International financial reform began in the early 1 970s with the adoption of flexible exchange 
rates. Large private financial flows resulted from global institutional changes in financial sectors 
and the creation of petro-dollars. However, because the Bretton Woods system was not initially 
designed to deal with financial issues, there is a major gap in the current financial architecture 
when it comes to handling private capital flows. 
The recent financial crisis in Asia and subsequent rapid spread to Russia and Latin America 
clearly demonstrated the rising role of private flows in the international financial market, the 
concomitant risks of these flows, and failure of the international financial system to safeguard the 
world economy from economic crisis. The more prominent specific issues related to the 
performance of financial markets in recent years include the following (ECLAC, 1999). 
e. Increasing volatility of capital flows: Capital flows tend to be pro-cyclical and heavily 
dependent on conditions in developing countries and in the financial markets of the 
industrialized countries. 
f. Contagion: Recent events have revealed that financial crises can spread to countries with 
sound economic structures and macroeconomic management. Furthermore, while market 
performance is often associated with the "market for information," there is always a 
danger in confusing information with opinion. 
g. Large bailout packages: In the last two decades, the largest IMF loans have gone to a 
few relatively large developing countries and emerging economies. Most bilateral lending 
has also gone towards relatively large economies. 
h. Concentration of capital flows: Private capital flows tend to be concentrated in middle 
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income countries. Moreover, there continues to be diminishing [official] financing for 
developing and least developed countries (LDC5). Indeed, the post-crisis situation begs 
the question of why the international community can mobilize large flows of capital for 
middle income countries experiencing crises, but not for LDCs? 
i. Implications for the domestic policies of developing countries: There are links 
between domestic financial risk and changes in key macroeconomic policy instruments, 
particularly exchange and interest rates are evidently stronger in developing countries, 
which imply that greater attention should be paid to these links and stricter prudential 
regulation by developing country policy-makers. 
2.2 The Official Policy Dialogue, its Short-comings and the Need for an Alternative Process 
The troublesome features of the operation of financial markets in recent years have been met not 
only with a lively academic debate on the issues, but also to high-level policy deliberations on 
reform of the international financial system. The G-7 is pursuing two avenues in international 
financial architecture reform in order to prevent future financial crises. The first relates to 
encouraging better discipline within the private sector, through better information, prudential 
regulations, and reform to bankruptcy laws. Since investors are not observing the risks that they 
take on, the aim of reforms is to arrive at conditions under which decisions of the private sector 
reflect the underlying risks of bearing the burden of crises. 
A second avenue is through support of a standstill clause. The rationale for this approach draws 
on the historical experience of the free banking era in the United States when banks issued their 
own notes, and had a legally-sanctioned right to declare inconvertibility in order to sell off assets 
to service notes. There were frequent crises but these were not severe, in part because banks were 
essentially self-regulated. Depositors made sure that they were depositing in an institution that 
was not taking on unreasonable risks. A debt standstill could prevent a crisis from worsening by 
creating a breathing space in which appropriate adjustments can be made. In this regard, a 
framework should be enunciated in advance with consistent rules. 
Despite the changes to international rules and the various initiatives proposed by the G-7, major 
crises in private markets are likely within the foreseeable future. These crises will result from 
differences between information and its interpretation (opinion), herd behaviour and situations 
yielding multiple-equilibria. Thus, policy directions must go beyond getting the right information 
and increasing supervision. One must also look beyond the present crisis and view the issues in a 
larger perspective. A system of global financial governance which receives broad international 
support is needed. To realize this, the international community must first arrive at consensus on 
the appropriate processes to design such a system. There is a window of opportunity in this 
regard. The governments of the U.K., Germany, France, Japan, Holland, and the Nordic countries 
are amenable to thinking about long-term processes through which an improved system may be 
designed. Canada should join this effort. 
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There are several reasons why the current official process of reform to the mechanisms of global 
financial governance is flawed. First, while the current international financial architecture is old 
and no longer accountable to its member countries, the official process merely addresses issues 
which could be described as "plumbing." Furthermore, the current process lacks direction and a 
good leader. It is dominated by vigorous disagreements between the U.S. and other countries 
involved, and this limits its effectiveness. Finally, the process is, for the most part, non- 
participatory since a majority of the world's population is not involved. 
The official process is also influenced by private lobbying. In fact, no sector is more heavily 
lobbied than the financial sector. Another concern is that much of the analysis relating to the 
international financial sector comes from the North and, moreover, is highly centralized within 
the North. Quality analysis that has taken place elsewhere has not made it into the current 
discourse. Jeffrey Sachs was quoted as saying that the process relating to reforming financial 
architecture is in many ways more important than the product itself. If the international 
community does not get the process right, it will be almost impossible to obtain anything near an 
optimal solution. 
Thus, there is a strong case to be made for a parallel process of discussions which is more 
broadly inclusive and representative. Such a parallel process would include discussions with 
technopols and those not involved in the official negotiations including many developing country 
representatives and NGOs. This parallel process presents an opportunity to voice their 
perspectives. 
There is a high return from third party analysis (i.e., analysis from independent sources who 
know the facts and issues at hand). There is a need for this alternative process to be participatory, 
skilled, and focused not on technical debates or issues that have been agreed upon in the official 
circles (such as how prudential regulation should be created), but on issues of greater dispute. 
The substantive issues related to the current operation and possible reforms to the international 
financial system and the framework of global financial governance which could be addressed by 
the envisioned parallel process are described below under three broad categories: crisis 
prevention and response; issues related to long-term development finance; and institutional 
structures and processes related to global financial governance (the foregoing is based upon 
presentations and discussions at the planning meeting for this initiative, which drew from 
ECLAC 1999, Helleiner and Oyejide, 1998 and Ocampo 1999). 
2.3 Crisis Prevention and Response (Short-term issues) 
a. The IMF and the institutional framework for international finance 
In response to financial crises, the IMF has advocated the implementation of prudential 
regulation and supervision and the disclosure of information at the domestic level. However, 
calls for transparency, better regulation and supervision must take into account a number of 
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issues. First, as has been discussed above, instability results when financial market behaviour 
responds to opinion as opposed to information. While the IMF plays an important role in 
providing information, it is often difficult to separate IMF information from IMF opinion, and 
thus, there are limits to what reforms in these areas can achieve. Second, credit rating agencies 
play an increasingly prominent role in disclosing information since private capital flows have 
pre-dominated the international financial market in recent years, however this disclosure has a 
pro-cyclical effect. In this light, several questions arise, such as how to manage sovereign ratings 
and whether to create objective standards. Third, discussions about prudential regulation and 
supervision relate to the microeconomic arena, and miss the macroeconomic dimensions of 
market behaviour which international standards should consider. 
b. Liquidity 
The world needs a lender-of-last-resort which avoids the risks of moral hazard. There is a need 
to focus on how this function could best be accomplished. At times of crises, the supply of 
liquidity must be increased and contingency financing for countries in difficulties must be made 
available before international reserves are exhausted. Inadequate funding for contingency 
financing may lead to a strong deflationary bias in macroeconomic policy and therefore more 
pro-cyclical economic activity. While the recent declaration and actions by the G-7 to ensure 
sufficient contingency financing should be welcomed, the tendency to accompany this with 
onerous conditions is troubling. 
c. Capital account regimes and exchange rate regimes 
The IMF has been pushing for capital convertibility. Michel Camdessus has recently argued that 
capital controls should only be used to allow 'breathing space,' should be temporary, and should 
be implemented only in places that are anticipating a crisis. There has been a strong push by 
developing countries to establish international rules for capital flows. Going beyond the IMF 
pre-occupation with full capital account convertibility, developing countries are pursuing a 
reform agenda that includes corporate codes of conduct. Most would like to move the discussion 
of MAI-related issues to a truly multilateral forum like the WTO. 
Most analysts and policy-makers agree that capital account liberalization should be 
gradual and should be followed by prudential regulation and supervision. Furthermore, most 
analysts agree that countries should attract long-term capital as opposed to relying too heavily on 
short-term flows. However, disagreements arise on whether international rules should prevail 
over national autonomy. Recent analyses have underlined that the benefits of capital account 
convertibility are less clear, and that a flexible approach is preferable to the IMF ' s rigid line on 
capital account convertibility. Some argue that developing countries should not give up their 
national autonomy in issues relating to capital account and exchange rate regimes unless a good 
contingency finance mechanism is in place. Others have noted that the IMF approach is divorced 
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from the reality of developing countries, for whom fully open capital accounts are impracticable.2 
In addition, there is still considerable debate about the effectiveness of different regimes, controls 
of capital outflows and inflows, and the use of quantitative as opposed to price-based controls. 
There is a need to explore different capital account regimes and the macroeconomic and 
developmental implications of various alternatives. 
A sticking point in international financial discussions is the management of the exchange 
rate. Some countries maintain pegged exchange rates as a form of risk management. However, 
the market wants to distribute risk in a more efficient way. In some cases, they go too far as they 
try to eliminate risks that cannot be eliminated (by the use of new innovations, for example). 
While the intellectual arguments tend to favour extreme solutions, actual exchange rate regimes 
lie somewhere in the middle of the extremes. There is no absolute solution when considering 
what is optimal and feasible. 
On a related note, issues of fiscal and monetary policy need to be addressed (including the 
debate between Joseph Stiglitz and the IMF on the appropriate mix of policy responses to the 
East Asian situation). There is also an imbalance between the fiscal requirements of dealing with 
financial crises and available financing. This is particularly acute when more Keynesian solutions 
are recommended. 
d. Macroeconomic coordination 
Weaknesses of the current system include: lack of coordination of macroeconomic issues at the 
international and regional levels; and asymmetry between the business cycle and the approval of 
IMF loans. More attention has to be given to improving the consistency of macroeconomic 
policies at the global level and to internalizing the externalities of macroeconomic developments 
in large economies. The recent crisis in Asia has demonstrated the need for international 
institutions to encourage macroeconomic policy coherence in industrial countries in order to 
avoid both inflationary and deflationary biases at the global level. The only move towards 
macroeconomic coordination has been within the EU. A more effective surveillance of national 
policies by the IMF and regional institutions is necessary to achieve consistency in 
macroeconomic policies. Macroeconomic policies, including decisions by central banks, should 
be subject to public scrutiny, as should the IMF itself. Developing countries are conspicuously 
absent from this discussion. 
e. Orderly debt workouts and standstill provisions 
To ensure the effectiveness of standstill provisions and debt workouts, there should be 
internationally approved "collective action clauses" in lending. Their generalized introduction 
would be crucial to avoid "free riding" problems and thus problems related to moral hazard. 
Furthermore, renegotiations should take place within a specified time limit, beyond which either 
the IMF or an independent panel would have the authority to determine the conditions of the debt 
2 The Chilean experience of taxing capital flows has received much attention as a 
possible model, but many papers have criticized this experience as inadequate. 
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rescheduling. In addition, "bailing in" of the private sector is evidently tricky — even former 
U.S. Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin could not accomplish this — but it is essential. 
f. Social safety nets 
Strong social safety nets are necessary to manage financial vulnerability in the developing world. 
The poorest sectors of society benefit only marginally from financial booms, but bear substantial 
costs of macroeconomic adjustments during crises. Thus, the recent call by the G-7 to design 
"general principles of good practice in social policy" is a step in the right direction but should not 
replace efforts aimed at protecting vulnerable groups and sectors during crises. A stable 
institutional system and anti-cyclical fiscal management is integral to the effective operation of 
social safety nets. 
2.4 Development Finance and Longer-term issues 
a. Financial Flows: ODA, Multilateral Finance, and Private Investment (FDI and Portfolio) 
Development and finance rarely figure prominently in international discussions. A major area of 
concern for LDCs is their reliance on ODA and multilateral development banks for funding. 
Development banks could play a counter-cyclical role in world financial crises, but because they 
are too small to make a difference themselves, they have to increase their effectiveness by 
enhancing 'crowding-in' of private-sector financing, by disbursing co-financed funds or 
guaranteeing new debts of developing and transition economies. The large requirements of 
counter-cyclical financing to middle income countries during crises should not crowd, out 
financing to poorer countries. 
Inter-linkages between FDI, trade, and portfolio capital flows should be studied. Many 
have seen FDI as an industrial organization issue that has little to do with capital flows. Past 
debates on the impacts of FDI have been over-shadowed by the more contemporary view that 
long term capItal flows are inherently more desirable than short term ones. However, traditional 
criticisms related to FDI have not gone away. Indeed, in an era of globalization they are 
accentuated. 
b. Debt overhang 
Implementation of the HIPC (Highly Indebted Poor Country) Initiative has been extremely slow 
due to lack of adequate financing and the conditionality involved. While the HIPC Initiative 
should certainly be broadened, bolder debt relief initiatives should also be considered. 
Furthermore, ODA should be a complement, not a substitute, for debt relief. There is a need for 
alternative financing mechanisms that do not crowd out ODA or other forms of development 
finance. As things now stand, the Central American Development Bank will be bankrupt if debt 
write-offs for Honduras and Nicaragua are not funded from outside the region. 
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c. Conditionality and Ownership of Policies and Programs 
Policies induced by the IFIs through mechanisms of conditionality raise obvious questions about 
national ownership and sustainability of policies, as well as for democratic governance. 
Moreover, the sphere of conditionality is broadening from questions of finance and economics, to 
politics, judicial systems and the environment. There is a great need for a measure national 
autonomy in policy-making in a broad range of policy spheres, including capital account 
regulation and exchange rate management, as discussed above. 
d. Equity 
As alluded to above, the causes and consequences of financial crises raise issues of equity, since 
the poorest sectors of society benefit only marginally from financial booms, but bear substantial 
costs of macroeconomic adjustments during crisis. This relates to the need to establish 
mechanisms of burden-sharing by official and private sector interests, and for social safety nets, 
as discussed above. Unfortunately, social safety nets associated with longer-term development 
finance have been put on the back burner as the exigencies of prevailing financial crises 
dominate discussions, despite the great need here to strengthen them. At the level of 
international equity, countries experiencing financial crises argue that lender countries also play a 
role in creating the crises, and therefore, that both crisis and lender countries must be part of the 
recovery process. But who should pay the costs of an economic crisis? Who should pay for the 
losses of those who suffer and the costs of helping them out? 
2.5 Institutional structures and processes related to global financial governance 
Despite recognition that the present institutions are not adequate to deal with recurring economic 
crises, there has been little move towards basic reform. Most of the reforms introduced by 
official circles have been very small changes, mainly pertaining to the IMF. Any financial 
stability forum that addresses issues of stronger international rules deals mainly with prudential 
regulation. Thus, there has not been any move towards institutional change. Improving 
'plumbing seems to have prevailed over redesigning architecture. The absence of a coordinated 
campaign for institutional reform at the international level is due to both the dominance of the 
United States and the lack of organization in the developing world. 
There are at least two broad issues that have remained unrecognized in the official debate on 
international financial reform. First, there has been no clear discussion on the exact roles and 
responsibilities that should be assigned to the various actors in international finance, including 
international, regional, and national institutions. Second, no international financial design is 
power-neutral, and therefore requires mechanisms of transparency and accountability. 
a. Roles and Responsibilities of the Various IFIs and Related Organizations 
The distribution of roles and responsibilities between regional bodies and the IMF/ World Bank, 
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and between these bodies, the B.I.S. (and other related bodies in Europe), and the WTO, needs to 
be examined. Further, the relative roles and responsibilities of the private sector and lender and 
crisis countries also need to be reassessed. 
The IMF is vying to become a world co-ordinator of economic issues and not just a 
provider of liquidity. Several moves to expand the mandate of the IMF can be observed, such as 
the push for conditionalities in controversial areas like the judicial system. The appropriateness 
of such conditionalities could indeed be challenged - from the perspective of democratic 
governance, among others - and particularly when economic difficulties are unrelated to domestic 
fundamentals. 
While macroeconomic surveillance and coordination is important at the global level, the 
Interim Committee can only mediate G-7 issues, while the BIS is not suited to the task. Regional 
institutions should play a much more fundamental role in order to achieve stability and to strike a 
balance in power relations at the international level. Strong regional reserve funds should deter 
speculators from attacking currencies and thus causing crises. One possibility is for countries or 
regions to have automatic access to IMF financing and/or an enhanced share in the allocation of 
fresh SDRs. 
Who should be in charge of managing and preventing future crises? Crisis countries feel 
that lender countries also play a role in creating crises. Thus, both crisis and lender countries 
must be part of the resolution process. But who should pay the costs of an economic crisis? Who 
should pay for the losses of those who suffer and the costs of helping them out? There are both 
direct and indirect costs. Direct costs refer to bailing out the banks and firms. Indirect costs cover 
a broader spectrum and include costs of helping out the millions of people who have nothing to 
do with the crisis, but who suffer from the crisis nonetheless. Many East Asian countries are able 
to pay for direct costs. Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Korea, for example, are sifting on large amounts 
of reserves. Holding these reserves is deflationary. Countries can instead use reserves as a 
common fund to defend themselves against future crises. However, the G-7 does not want to talk 
about increasing contributions to the IMF by countries that are willing and able to do so because 
of the resulting quota (and voting) adjustment. 
There are systemic deficiencies not in crisis countries, but in capital-source countries. 
Distinguishing between capital-recipient and capital-source countries is instructive here. 
Movements in the relative values of the maj or currencies (dollar, yen, and euro) have real effects 
on the terms of trade. What can be done about greater coordination of the exchange rate regime 
of the major currencies? 
Issues of burden-sharing between official and private interests and within developed and 
developing countries also need to be addressed. Also of note here is the attempt being made by 
major industrial countries to push responsibilities onto the multilateral institutions, for which 
they are not willing to pay. 
b. Transparency, Control and Accountability in Decision-making and Operations of the IFIs 
A few developed countries have an overwhelming comparative advantage in financial services, 
among which there is some opposition to capital controls based on the premise that they are bad 
for business. How can the hold of a small group of countries on the international financial 
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institutions be broken? Can they be persuaded that it is in their long-term democratic interest to 
relinquish their control? Issues of power are at the core of discussions on reform of the 
international financial system. 
In partial answer to this point, two questions could be addressed through a political 
science analysis. The first question is what should be the division of responsibilities among 
national, regional and international levels? There are already clear criteria based on efficiency 
and legitimacy which have been developed through the EU process. At present, the division of 
responsibilities is very politically-based, as in, for example, the IMP's move to prevent an Asian 
solution to the regional financial crisis. Secondly, how should the job be done? The key is to 
explore what would induce the US to give up control of the international financial process. A 
focus on efficiency arguments is important: for example, the benefits to the US of properly 
foreseeing crises and designing appropriate responses even within a system of diminished US 
influence. 
Finally, the transition between the process and the actual international architecture could 
entail possible conflicts. Therefore designing appropriate rules for the new architecture is a 
much needed task. The current reform process is very different from the Bretton Woods process 
since now there are vested interests in the status quo. In defining what rules should apply, 
countries may disagree substantially. The North-South division in particular is an under- 
representation of the actual set of relationships and interests that prevail among the countries of 
the world. 
Regional institutions and peer review could play a crucial role in surveillance, both of 
macroeconomic policies and of domestic financial regulation and supervision. Such surveillance 
and peer review could be more acceptable to countries than that of a single, powerful 
international institution. Finally, an international system that relies on one or a few international 
institutions is less neutral than one that relies on a network of regional institutions and on peer 
review among national institutions. 
In Korea and Thailand, financial intermediation is not occurring and support to financial 
sectors is turning into control. A recent survey pointed to a lack of credibility in IMF 
information. It is unclear why serious research on what hedge funds and investment banks are 
doing has not been pursued. There is a lack of understanding on how these entities work. 
Emphasis on transparency in the activities of national financial institutions has to be balanced 
with an equal emphasis on transparency in the operations of international investment houses. 
However, a reform process based on transparency and standards considerations enables the 
existing powers to continue to control the system. Fundamental reform is required to prevent this 
from happening. 
While the issue of stabilization is a frequently-used term in the reform debate, its 
meaning is often yet unclear. Stabilization for whom? Equity is an issue that must be brought 
back into the discussions. 
Finally, as mentioned earlier, there has been discerning trend has been the tendency for 
political concepts to become integrated into the IMF's conditionalities, which raises issues at the 
interface of accountability and democratic governance, which need to be addressed. 
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3. Objectives 
The general objective of this initiative is to initiate a process of analysis, dialogue, and 
progressive change with a view to making the international financial system more stable, 
effective and equitable. 
The specific objectives of this initiative are to: 
i. bring developing country perspectives to bear on leading issues in international finance; 
ii. provide a forum for members of the research, policy, NGO, and private sector 
communities in developed and developing countries to debate leading issues in 
international finance; and 
iii. create [or develop] the capacity for discussion of leading issues in international finance in 
developing countries. 
4. Defining Features of the Initiative 
The key features of this initiative, which also differentiate it from other groups working on 
similar issues, are that: 
i. this is a process, not an event, with emphasis on providing long-term support for research, 
dissemination, and networking activities among key stakeholders in the international 
financial system; 
ii. emphasis will be placed on developing country perspectives, highlighting the variety of 
positions that exist among this group of countries, rather than attempting to build 
consensus or generate statements on broad sets of topics; 
iii. emphasis will be placed on the equity aspects of the current debate on international 
financial issues, and on political economy approaches to their resolution; 
iv. the focus will be on marshaling available research rather than generating new technical 
analyses, and on using varied modes of dissemination. 
5. Ambit (Conceptual Framework and Research Approach) 
The coverage of the work of this initiative will comprise the set of issues that straddle the current 
international financial architecture, trade, and international economic governance debates, as 
elaborated in section 2 of this proposal. Bearing in mind the dynamic nature of discussions in 
these areas, topics are divided into three categories, each of which will be covered by a working 
group (WG). WGs will determine the priority that they place on each of the topics that come 
under their wing, and also the addition and elimination of topics as circumstances warrant. At the 
planning meeting, the following division of topics into WGs was accepted [adopted]: 
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Group I: 
Crisis Prevention and 








— conditionality and 
standards 
— capital account regimes 





— social safety nets 
— ODA 
— multilateral official finance 
— private flows (FDI and 
portfolio) 
— debt overhang 
— conditionality and 
ownership 
— equity 
— roles and responsibilities 
of the various IFIs and 
related organizations 
— control and accountability 
of IFIs 
— transparency in decision- 
making and operations of 
the IFIs 
It is understood that the topics of each WG are not exclusive to that category, and that cross-over 
exists and is necessary. For example, "exchange rate regimes" are both a short-term and a longer 
term issue; "transparency" covers several short-term issues as well as more institutional issues. A 
second cross-cutting feature that would characterize the work of the WGs is to focus on the level 
at which decision making and implementation does and should occur. One way to portray this is 
to pose four sets of underlying questions for each specific topic that is treated: 
1. What do the multilateral IFIs do? What can they do? What should they do? 
2. What do the international banks do? What can they do? What should they do? 
3. What do the RDBs do? What can they do? What should they do? 
4. What do national governments do? What can they do? What should they do? 
8. Structure and Operation 
The initiative will comprise three Working Groups (WG5), each led by a chair, a Steering 
Committee, and backed by a Secretariat located at IDRC. The initiative will organize one large 
meeting per year and several smaller ones in order to organize its work plan and disseminate its 
outputs. 
Appendix I contains a suggested list of members for the WGs and possible chairs, based on the 
meeting discussions and subsequent suggestions that many participants sent in. Chairs will be 
responsible for the design of the WGs and their program of work, as well as for overall WG 
operations. Specifically, Chair responsibilities will include: taking the lead in determining 
membership of the WG; designing the program of work and prioritizing among topics; 
commissioning surveys of the literature or fresh research; convening one working meeting of the 
group per year (the second would be as part of the annual meeting of the initiative itself); 
determining a dissemination strategy for the work of the WG; and participating in the overall 
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functioning of the initiative via membership in the Steering Committee. 
The Steering Committee (SC) which will comprise each Chair as well as a representative of 
IDRC and of FONDAD. The SC will set direction for the initiative, facilitate linkages between 
the WGs, and be responsible for the overall dissemination strategy. 
During the launch phase, the initiative will be served by a small group of IDRC staff with 
Rohinton Medhora serving as the focal point. This relationship is best developed at the first 
working meeting of the SC, when WG chairs, in particular, could assess their respective roles 
and voice their needs relative to their (or their institution's) attributes. 
The operation of the Initiative with comprise three general functions: a forum for dialogue 
between officials of developed and developing countries; a think-tank to disseminate research; 
and networking where researchers and policy-makers can exchange ideas. While each of these 
three functions are necessary and complementary, the Initiative will focus more on dialogue than 
on undertaking new technical analysis, since many publications already exist which can be used 
as inputs to the dialogue on reforming the system of global financial governance. 
9. Program of Work (to be developed by the chairs of the working groups) 
9.1 Crisis Prevention and Response (Short-term issues) 
9.2 Development Finance and Longer-term issues 
9.3 Institutional Governance 
10. Users, beneficiaries and Dissemination 
The users and beneficiaries of the proposed initiative include Southern and Northern researchers, 
officials, and NGOs with an interest in developing new structures of global financial governance, 
as well as officials of the IFIs (including the regional institutions). Representatives of this range 
of stakeholders will be engaged in the parallel process of dialogue envisioned through this 
Initiative, to the greatest extent possible, with a view to influencing the process of discussion and 
reform occurring at the official level. 
The process will include an ambitious dissemination program, which aims to spread awareness 
about the need to reform the current international financial system, and to engage the broadest 
possible public in discussions and advocacy for reform. The results of each meeting should be 
published and made available through the Internet. Coverage of the process via popular media 
should also occur. A television documentary, which clearly articulates the need for reform, can 
be broadcast in English, Spanish, and French. In addition, articles should be submitted to The 
Economist and Financial Times, as well as other regional or national press. Possible journalists 
who might be good candidates in disseminating information (either through television, 
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newspapers or magazines) include Martin Wolfe, Peter Norman, Lionel Barber, Jeff Madrick and 
David Crane. 
11. Timeline 
Three to five years. 
12. Budget 
To be determined 
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Appendix I: Proposed Working Group Membership 
José Antonio Ocampo (chair) 




(Brazil, now private sector) 
Diane Bison 
Brian Kahn 
(U. Of Cape Town) 
John McCallum 
(or Kurt von dem Hagen, Royal 
Bank, Canada) 
Manual (Butch) Montes 
(Ford Foundation, NY) 
Avinash Persaud 






Montek Ahluwalia (chair) 





(AfDI at AfOB) 
Kwesi Botchwey (chair) 







Alex Duncan/Angela Woods 
(Bretton Woods Project, UK) 
Al Fishiow 






(Iran, Dean of IMF EDs) 
Moises Naim 
(editor, Foreign Policy) 
Charles Soludo 
(various affiliations, Nigeria) 
Zaenal Aznam Yusof 
(Dpty DG, ISIS, KL, Malaysia) 
Group I 






(VP, People's Bank of China) 
Percy Mistry 
Marcos Caramuru de Paiva 
(Sec'y for Int'l Affairs, Brazil) 
Yung Chul Park 
Cyril Ramaphosa 
(South Africa, private sector) 
Richard Webb 
(Peru) 
John Toye 
(UNCTAD) 
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